In T -period agency models with imperfect public monitoring where signals can depend arbitrarily on past actions and exhibit serial correlation, I identify two basic properties of the signal processes, the concentration of measure and the informativeness, that help implement near-efficient outcomes when T is large.
Introduction
The question of what basic properties of the monitoring technology allow us to sustain near-efficient outcomes in general agency models has important implications for executive compensation, the internal organization of firms and the monitoring role of social media. So far, existing agency theories have worked out special cases where near-efficiency obtains (e.g., Radner (1985) ) and does not (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) , Sannikov (2008) ). In this paper, I consider general agency models with imperfect public monitoring between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent over finite T instances where signals can depend arbitrarily on past actions and exhibit serial correlation. In this general environment, I attribute the implementability of near-efficiency when T is large to two basic properties of the monitoring technology, the concentration of measure and the informativeness, but not to other model details. I also show that these two properties are almost necessary for attaining asymptotic near-efficiency in a class of agency models with frequent actions. To prove these results, I construct test contracts which attain robust performances for each T even if details of the signal processes are not exactly known to the principal.
To fix ideas, consider a simple example: 1 Example 1. A risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent interact over finite T instances and sign a binding contract at the outset when they face zero outside options. At each instant t = 1, · · · , T , the agent exerts high or low effort a t ∈ {0, 1} and generates a random public revenue Y t ∈ Ω T = {H, L} which depends on the past only through the effort history a t = (a 1 , · · · , a t ) in an arbitrary manner. The agent's total payoff T t=1 u(ψ t ) − c(a t ) equals the utility from consumption minus the effort cost where u(·) is increasing, concave and unbounded from below, whereas the principal's total profit T t=1 Y t − ψ t equals the revenue minus the consumption payment. In the complete information benchmark, it is optimal for the principal to elicit the efficient effort profile 1 T (1, · · · , 1), pay a fixed consumption u −1 (c) in each period and earn a per-period expected profit w − u −1 (c) where c c(1) and w
The current analysis concerns how to approximate this profit level as T → ∞ for arbitrary revenue processes that satisfy the above assumptions when effort is unobservable to the principal.
Consider the average-revenue test contract which delivers a fixed consumption to the agent at each date t = 1, 2, · · · , T and tests whether the mean of realized revenues is above a threshold w − b T or not at date T where b T T − 1 2 +ε for some arbitrary ε ∈ 0, 1 2 . If the result is negative, then the agent fails the test and experiences a utility loss αcT for some arbitrary α > 1 -see Figure 1 for a graphical illustration. Albeit simple, this contract yields a fraction 1 − O(b T ) of the full surplus when T is large. 2 Intuitively, near-efficiency obtains if the contract provides almost full insurance and near-optimal incentive simultaneously. In the current setting, this is achieved by specifying an appropriate b T that imposes tight upper bounds on both the probability that the agent can pass the test by sheer luck and the extent that he can manipulate the outcome by fine-tuning the effort choice with the history. The robustness of these bounds leads to quick yet sharp characterizations of the equilibrium outcome despite that the technology can be highly persistent and the equilibrium strategy, which can exhibit arbitrary history dependencies, is difficult to compute directly.
Specifically, fix T ∈ N and define the regular event by realizations of the performance test statistic that are concentrated around its mean at the data generating effort profile by b T , i.e., | 1
Notice that agent benefits from deviations in two cases:
• First, he shirks a lot at the irregular event. However, the concentration property of the revenue processes says that these events are rare. Indeed, since revenues are bounded independent random variables, it follows from McDiarmid (1989) that there is a uniform upper bound µ T 2 exp −
for the probability of the irregular event over all data generating effort profiles a T ∈ {0, 1} T . The uniformity of this bound allows us to draw robust inferences about the equilibrium outcome no matter how complex the equilibrium strategy is.
• Second, he fine-tunes the strategy with the history and manages to pass by spending a low effort cost at the regular event. Fortunately, the informativeness of the revenue processes says that this is impossible because passing the test at the regular event, i.e., 1 authors that in these settings, the optimal contract is typically inefficient even for large T s. This is not a coincidence. Intuitively, since Brownian motion has poor concentration properties, it is typical for the performance test statistic to drift away from its mean as time proceeds. As a result, we need b T to be large in order to keep the irregular event rare. But then the agent can deviate to inferior effort profiles but still pass easily at the regular event -see Figure 2 for a graphical illustration. From a practical viewpoint, the current result creates a partial ranking over monitoring technologies and sheds light on what information should be included in executive compensations and labor contracts when employee contributions are gradually realized over time and what the role of social media is in monitoring the implementation of reform plans which may take long to generate breakthroughs. For instance, it suggests that other things being equal, one would prefer Poisson process to Brownian motion because the former has a better concentration property and yields a higher surplus over a large class of production and monitoring technologies.
To prove these results, I propose a class of simple contracts, test contracts, and derive explicit lower bounds for their profitabilities for each number of interactions T based on the uniform probability bound that is prescribed by concentration inequalities and the uniform payoff bound that obtains from the informativeness of the signal processes. The test contract has many robustness properties: it depends on few model parameters that are easy to estimate and thus imposes little knowledge burden on the principal; it can be easily adapted to implement general target strategies (Section 4.1); it can encompass varying considerations such as hidden savings (Appendix B.1), persistent hidden characteristics (Appendix B.2), limited liability (Appendix B.3) and team production (Appendix B.4); in practical situations where the principal knows few details about a potentially complex monitoring technology, it offers guidance to what to contract upon and provides a robust profit guarantee that is difficult to improve upon (Appendix B.5).
Related Literature
Near-efficiency in agency models and mechanisms The current paper adds to the literature on implementing near-efficiency in agency models and mechanisms, including Mirrlees (1974) , Müller (1997) , Rubinstein and Yaari (1983) , Radner (1981) , Radner (1981) , Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) and Escobar and Toikka (2013) , among many others. In particular, Mirrlees (1974) and subsequently Müller (1997) show that in static contracting problems where terrible outcomes are near-conclusive evidence of shirking and the agent's utility is unbounded from below, 3 a two-step scheme that pays a fixed consumption most of the time and penalizes only terrible outcomes is near-efficient. My result suggests that Mirrlees (1974) 's insight carries over to dynamic settings that satisfy two basic properties of the monitoring technologies such that asymptotically, cheap persistent deviations lead to drastic changes in the tail distribution of the performance test statistic.
The current work generalizes the analysis of Radner (1981) and Radner (1985) . Radner (1981) considers a dynamic agency game where outputs depend only on the concurrent action and take value in a uniformly bounded set that is independent of the number of interactions. Under these assumptions, he examines a different question of whether exerting high effort all the time until the mean of outputs falls short of a threshold for the first time is ex-ante ε-optimal when the horizon is long, and uses pointwise convergence theorems (e.g., the Law of the iterated logarithm) which are silent about the relative convergence rate of the performance test statistic at varying action profiles and cannot be used immediately for equilibrium characterizations when strategies can exhibit arbitrary history dependencies. Radner (1985) extends the analysis of Radner (1981) into an infinitely repeated agency game and proves a Folk Theorem using recursive methods and pointwise convergence theorems. The current work shows that near-efficiency obtains in general environments even if recursive structures are lacking.
The current analysis differs from Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) and Escobar and Toikka (2013) in important respects. 4 Specifically, these authors examine multiagent screening problems without monetary transfers where preference types follow exogenous i.i.d. or Markov processes and budget the agents' reports according to 3 Specifically, these authors require that the first order approach is valid and the likelihood ratio becomes infinitely negative as the outcome approaches the lower bound of the signal distribution.
4 Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) shows that if each player simultaneously observes his i.i.d. preference types over many replicas of the same social choice problem and is restricted to announce types whose empirical distribution fits exactly the theoretical distribution of true types, then Paretoefficiency is virtually implementable when the number of problems is sufficiently large. Escobar and Toikka (2013) extends Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) to a dynamic setting where each individual's types follow an AR(1) process and shows that when the horizon is long but finite, reporting as truthfully as possible is an ε-equilibrium of the dynamic game where each individual is restricted to announce preference types whose conditional distribution given the others' reports must be bounded around the theoretical distribution of one's true signal given the others' true signals.
details of the preference type process in order to overcome the challenge that arises from the lack of monetary transfers. In contrast, I consider single-agent moral hazard problems with monetary transfers where signals depend endogenously on the agent's actions, use tests to draw robust inferences about the equilibrium outcome when the monitoring technology is persistent and complex, identify basic properties of the monitoring technology that help sustain asymptotic near-efficiency and show the tightness of the sufficient condition in the case where signals are almost Brownian.
Contracting with frequent actions Many prior studies on contracting with frequent actions such as Hellwig and Schmidt (2002) , Biais et al. (2007) and Sadzik and Stacchetti (2013) consider the discrete-time analog of continuous-time agency models with Brownian signals. All these studies match the standard deviation of the signal per time interval to its counterpart under Brownian motion. The most relevant to the current work is Sadzik and Stacchetti (2013) which examines a general infinitehorizon agency model with stationary technologies and uses linear-quadratic approximations to show that when T is large, the optimal contract is typically inefficient if the minimum standard deviation of the agent's continuation value that guarantees incentive compatibility over each interval of length 1/T is Θ 1/ √ T , a noise level at which many heuristic test statistics cannot have sufficiently concentrated measures and convey enough information about the agent's true profit contribution simultaneously. This means that my sufficient condition for attaining asymptotic near-efficiency is almost necessary in the environment of Sadzik and Stacchetti (2013) .
Contracting with persistent technologies In order to derive an explicit profit bound for the test contract for each number of interactions T , I make use of concentration inequalities, which, roughly speaking, prescribe for each sample size T ∈ N and ε > 0 a uniform upper bound for the probability that a large class of well-behaved performance statistics differ from their expected values by more than ε. The uniformity of the probability bound dispenses us with meticulous calculations of the equilibrium strategy and the burden of knowing exact details about the signal processes at deviation action profiles. This feature distinguishes the test contract from standard incentive contracts which vary the incentive payment with the outcome of a likelihood ratio test that compares the signal distribution at the target action profile versus deviation action profiles. While this method generates useful characterizations of the optimal contract in certain environments (e.g., static settings (Laffont and Tirole (1993) ) or dynamic settings where actions affect only the concurrent outcome (Spear and Srivastava (1987) , Sannikov (2008) ), it becomes restrictive when signals can depend on past actions because then the principal has to know the past actions exactly in order to construct the relevant likelihood ratio test, a problem which quickly becomes intractable when the technological persistence is arbitrary. The closest work on contracting with persistent technologies is Sannikov (2013) which allow actions to affect the mean of future revenues. However, Sannikov (2013) considers Brownian signals and makes detailed parametric assumptions about the monitoring technology whereas the current analysis does exactly the opposite.
Robust dynamic contract The closest work on robust dynamic contract is Chassang (2013) which considers a dynamic agency model where the agent manages a number of assets whose returns can depend arbitrarily on past returns and develops an algorithm that approximates the outcome of linear contracts in the high liability benchmark. The current work differs from Chassang (2013) in three important dimensions. First, the agent of Chassang (2013) is risk-neutral, is protected by limited liability and takes the signal process as given whereas the agent in the current work is risk-averse and takes actions that affect the signal process endogenously. Second, the problem of Chassang (2013)'s the principal is essentially to keep the agent's share of the output close to its counterpart in the high liability benchmark whereas the problem of the current principal is to draw inferences about the equilibrium action. Third, Chassang (2013) obtains robustness through recovering linearity whereas the current work does so through robust inferences. As a result, Chassang (2013)'s contract, which decreases the size of the project managed by the agent, may lead to low profits in the current setting if future successes depend crucially on past investments. Conversely, the test contract, which makes use of large penalties, may perform poorly if limited liability is severely binding. 5 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 lays down the statistical background; Section 3 describes the model (Section 3.1), states and proves the main result (Sections 3.2-3.3) and illustrates its theoretical and practical implications in concrete examples (Section 3.4); Section 4 investigates several extensions; Section 5 concludes. See Appendix A for simulation results, Appendix B for robustness issues and Appendix C for omitted proofs.
Statistical Background
Concentration Inequality Concentration of measure is fairly general phenomenon which, roughly speaking, says that a well-behaved function defined on a high dimensional probability space almost always takes values that are close to its mean. Concentration inequalities prescribe for each sample size T ∈ N and ε > 0 a uniform upper bound for the probability that a large class of well-behaved functions differ from their expected values by more than ε. 6 Most examples considered below make use of McDiarmid (1989)'s concentration inequality for independent (but not necessarily identical) random variables and Kontorovich and Ramanan (2008)'s concentration inequality for Markov chains with bounded contraction coefficients.
for some γ 1 , · · · , γ T > 0, then for any ε > 0, we have
x t , then the right hand side of (2.2) and (2.
x t for some r > 0, then the right hand side of (2.2) and (2.3) equals approximately exp −2T ε 2 g(r)
Ω 2 for some g(r) that depends only on r when T is large. Kontorovich and Ramanan (2008) Fix an arbitrary T ∈ N and let X = (X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X T ) be a (possibly inhomogeneous) Markov chain that is defined on a countable sample space Ω and a Markov measure P. Denote the initial distribution, the transition kernels and the contraction coefficients by p 0 (·), {p t (·|·)} T −1 t=1 and {θ t } T −1 t=1 , respectively. 7 If ϕ : Ω T → R is c-Lipschitz with respect to the normalized Hamming metric for some c > 0, 8 then for any ε > 0,
In particular, if there exists θ ∈ (0, 1) such that θ t ≤ θ for all t = 1, 2, · · · , T , then (2.4) and (2.5) are bounded from above by exp
3 Baseline Model
Setup
Environment The principal (she) and the agent (he) interact over finite T instances and face zero outside options at the outset when they sign binding contracts. The agent takes a private action a t ∈ A = R + , receives a consumption ψ t ∈ R at each date t = 1, · · · , T and earns a total payoff U (ψ 1 , · · · , ψ T ) − C (a 1 , · · · , a T ) where C(·) ≥ 0 and C(0, · · · , 0) = 0. From the principal's viewpoint, each T -period action profile a T = (a 1 , · · · , a T ) improves her welfare by W a T , and the cheapest way of awarding the agent a gross utility level V is to pay a stream of fixed consumptions which costs herself Ψ(V ) for some increasing function Ψ : Ω -Lipschitz with respect to the normalized Hamming metric, respectively.
but also allows for more sophisticated intertemporal preferences such as discounting and non-separability. For the time being, I restrict attention to W (·) and C(·) that depend only on a T and defer the discussion on general production technologies to Section 4.1.
The principal observes neither the action nor the welfare improvement directly. At the end of each instant t = 1, · · · , T , she observes the realization of a random public signal Y t that is defined on a measurable space (Ω T , F T ). Denote by Y 1 , · · · , Y T : a T the signal process generated by an arbitrary a T , and define the monitoring technology by the signal processes at varying action profiles:
For the most part, assume that I(T ) is common knowledge and consider monitoring technologies where signals are independent random variables for each given data generating action profile:
Assumption 1 says that signals can depend on the past only through the action history but in an arbitrary manner. This assumption substantially generalizes the common assumption in the dynamic agency literature that signals can depend only on the concurrent action. The fact that it imposes no restriction on how Y t might depend on a t makes the model particularly suitable for analyzing incentive problems in, say, academic researches and political reforms where past actions have very persistent impacts on future outcomes.
Target Action Profile The agent's strategy σ T = {σ t,T : A t−1 ×Ω t−1 T → ∆(A)} is a collection of mappings from the history of actions and signals to the current action choice. In this section, I separate monitoring from production by assuming that there is a pure action profile that maximizes the expected surplus. This assumption will be relaxed in Section 4.1 where I extend the analysis to implement general target strategies:
Assumption 2. There exists a * T = (a * 1,T , · · · , a * T,T ) such that
as the welfare improvement, the action cost and the surplus of a * T , respectively, all of which are assumed to be strictly positive. From now on, I will refer to a * T as the target action profile.
as the ratio between the infimum of welfare improvements and the welfare improvement at the target action profile.
Performance Test Statistic For any performance test statistic ϕ T : Ω T T → R and data generating action profile a T ∈ A T , I say that the signals generated by a T are b T -regular with respect to a T under ϕ T for some b T > 0 (denote this event by E a T ; b T , ϕ T ) if the performance test statistic differs from its mean at the data generating action profile by at most b T :
Similarly, I say that the signals generated by
Assumption 3 is the key assumption of this paper. Intuitively, Part (i) says that the performance test statistic, which is a function of T independent random variables for each given data generating action profile, exhibits concentrated measures such that there is a uniform upper bound for the probability of the regular event over all data generating action profiles which vanishes as T grows to infinity. This assumption holds in many applications (see Section 3.4) where the concentration bound depends on few robust features of the signal processes. In Example 1 it follows from the assumption that Y 1 , · · · , Y T are uniformly bounded for all a T ∈ A T .
Meanwhile, Part (ii) says that the test statistic is sufficiently informative of the data generating action profile in the sense that if the mean of test statistic at the data generating action profile and the target action profile are close, then the data generating action profile must lead to a large welfare improvement at a non-trivial action cost. This assumption amounts to a weak local restriction on the informativeness of the performance test statistic. In Example 1 it obtains from the efficiency of the target effort profile and the fact that the performance test statistic and the per-period expected revenue coincide.
Finally, Part (iii) says that the agent can be effectively penalized by decreases in the last period consumption. This part can be relaxed if players have future interactions because then the agent can be penalized by changes in the continuation value instead.
Test Contract
The contract pays a performance-independent consumption ψ T to the agent at each t = 1, · · · , T −1 and computes the sample test statistic ϕ T (Y) at the end of instant T . If ϕ T (Y) ∈ R c T , then the agent passes the test and receives ψ T as before. Otherwise he fails the test and earns ψ T instead. The contract induces a dynamic game where the solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium strategy σ * T is defined by
And the contract satisfies the agent's ex-ante participation constraint if
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1 -3, there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ *
The probability of failure is bounded from above by
The ratio between the profitability of the test contract and the full surplus is bounded from below by
As T → ∞, (a) The probability of failure is vanishing:
The expected profit is near-optimal if the second term of (ii) is vanishing.
Proof of Theorem 1
I now sketch the proof of Theorem 1 Parts (i) and (a) -see Appendix C for Parts (ii) and (b). First, note that if the agent passes the test at the event where signals are b T -regular with respect to the data generating action profile, then the welfare improvement and the action cost of the data generating action profile is bounded uniformly from below by W * T (1 − w T ) and C * T (1 − c T ), respectively:
Proof. By assumption, we have (1) 
The result follows from Assumption 3.
The fact that the probability bound in Assumption 3 holds uniformly over all action profiles plays a crucial role in the proof below:
Proof. Define
as the equilibrium probability of the regular event, and
as the equilibrium probability that signals are regular and yet the agent fails the test. By Assumption 3 (i), we have
(3.10) Parts (i) and (a): First, bound the agent's equilibrium payoff from above by
where (1) is attained if the agent pays the penalty for failing the test yet incurs no action cost, (2) is attained if he passes the test at the regular event and thus spends at least C * T (1 − c T ) on action costs, and (3) is attained if he takes the lowest action and pays no penalty at the irregular event. Second, notice that if the agent takes a * T instead, then he incurs an action cost C * T but fails the test only at the complement of the semi-regular event whose probability is bounded from above by µ − T . Thus, his expected payoff is bounded from below by
Since the first expression is weakly greater the second one, it follows that
Based on this result, bound the equilibrium probability of failure from below by
Special Cases
Example 2 (Contracting with frequent actions). Time evolves continuously over [0, 1] and players share a common interest rate r > 0. The economy indexed by T ∈ N divides the unit time interval into T sub-intervals of equal length ∆
T t=1 exp(− rt T ) stands for the effective horizon length. Assume that W * T and C * T ∼ Θ(1) as T → ∞. Consider the discounted average-revenue test contract which tests if ϕ T (Y) = M −1 (T, r) T t=1 exp − rt T Y t belongs to the corresponding rejection region or not.
for some g(r) when T is large (see Remark 2), Assumption 3 (i) and (ii) hold simultaneously if and only if {b
Example 3 (Discrete-time approximation of Brownian motion). This example is taken from Sadzik and Stacchetti (2013)'s discrete-time approximation of continuoustime agency models with Brownian signals. In the above example, suppose that Y t = a t + Z t √ T where Z 1 , · · · , Z T are i.i.d. random variables with mean 0 and variance σ 2 . By independence, we have 
T + µ T g(r)σ 2 → 0 as T → ∞, a contradiction. Therefore, Assumption 3 (i) and (ii) cannot hold simultaneously.
Indeed, the same is true for Hellwig and Schmidt (2002) 's discrete-time approximation of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) where Y t ∈ {y 1 √ T , · · · , y N √ T }, and for Biais et al. (2007) 's discrete-time analog of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) where Y t ∈ {y 1 √ T , y 2 √ T }. All these papers match the standard deviation of the signal per period with its counterpart under Brownian motion. At this noise level, it is hard to conceive any performance test statistic that has sufficiently concentrated measures and conveys enough information about the true action at the same time.
This intuition is confirmed by Sadzik and Stacchetti (2013) which examines an infinite horizon agency model with limited liability. To make the comparison fair, let us fix an arbitrarily small ε > 0 and divide the infinite horizon into many blocks of length L where c(a * ) L 0 e −rs ds ε ∞ L e −rs ds, i.e., the total cost of the target effort level in each block is much smaller than the net present value from earning a net payoff ε from the next block onward. Now suppose to the contrary that there is a near-efficient test contract when T is large in our model. Then the principal of Sadzik and Stacchetti (2013) can extract almost full surplus in the infinite horizon model with limited liability when actions are sufficiently frequent by implementing this contract in each block and rewarding the agent a net flow payoff ε so long as the relationship continues but switching to no production and the lowest consumption payment when the agent fails the test for the first time. But this contradicts with their result that the optimal contract is strictly inefficient when T is large so long as the Fisher information metric of Z t is finite. 910 Example 4 (Discrete-time approximation of Poisson process). In Example 2, suppose that a binary signal Y t ∈ {0, 1} is publicly realized at each instant t∆ T , t = 1, · · · , T where Y t = 1 conveys good news about the agent's action and occurs with probability λ (a t ) ∆ T over [(t − 1)∆ T , t∆ T ]. When ∆ T is small, such process is the discrete-time 9 The Fisher information metric of a random variable X with density function g(x) is defined by g (x) 2 g(x) dx. It is finite for many common distributions such as normal, double exponential, etc. 10 The discussion so far implies that in infinite horizon models with limited liability, one can still use the test contract as a building block at the initial stage of the game and then mix it with low-powered incentive schemes as the agent's continuation value deteriorates. analog of a time-inhomogeneous Poisson process with arrival rate λ (a t ). 11 Consider the test contract based on the discounted mean of good signals, i.e.,
satisfies Assumption 3 (ii), then the contract is near-efficient when T is large. 12 In Appendix A, I simulate the performance of this contract treating one period as a quarter and applying the standard annual interest rate 5%. The result that the probability of failure reaches below 10% for reasonable model parameters suggests that near-efficiency obtains over a relatively short time span under natural assumptions about the production technology and the utility function.
The implication of these results is threefold. First, one may interpret Theorem 1 as a dynamic analog of Mirrlees (1974) which, together with Müller (1997) , shows that in static contracting problems where terrible outcomes are near-conclusive evidence of shirking, a two-step scheme that penalizes only terrible outcomes attains near-efficiency by providing almost full insurance and near-optimal incentives simultaneously. Theorem 1 extends this idea to dynamic settings where the signal per-period is not too noisy so that the aggregate performance test statistic has sufficiently concentrated measures asymptotically. Second, the difference between Examples 2 and 3 suggests that our sufficient condition for attaining asymptotic near-efficiency is almost necessary in a class of agency models with frequent actions.
Third, the result creates a partial ranking over monitoring technologies based two basic properties and sheds light on what kind of monitoring technology the principal should acquire as part of the mechanism design problem. For example, many existing studies on executive compensation (e.g., DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) ) monitor the CEO by Brownian cash flows whose poor concentration property leads to non-trivial efficiency losses. Theorem 1 suggests that if members of the executive board can choose freely which monitoring technologies should be used, then will prefer signal 11 Existing models on contracting under stationary poisson technologies involves more contractual frictions. For example, Biais et al. (2010) assumes the agent is more impatient than the principal whereas He (2012) allows actions to have non-contractual impacts on the principal's welfare.
12 Abreu et al. (1991) shows that in two-player prisoner's dilemma games with imperfect public monitoring, good signals cannot sustain near-efficiency because at the optimal outcome of the likelihood ratio test that is used to detect deviations, players are falsely identified as a cheater with a non-trivial probability. This is not the case here because the current performance test passes the agent who takes the target action profile with a high probability.
processes with better concentration properties, e.g., Poisson processes. Likewise, it will not be surprising if in practice, Poisson signals are indeed more expensive to acquire than Brownian signals.
Extensions

Implement General Target Strategies
Environment Now suppose that a T -period action profile a T incurs a total cost C a T , Y to the agent and improves the principal's welfare by W a T , Y , where inf a T ,y T W a T , y T > −∞ and inf a T ,y T C a T , y T = C(0, · · · , 0, y T ) = 0. Take an arbitrary as the ratio between the infimum of the principal's welfare improvement and its counterpart atσ T . Underσ T , a pair of action-signal profile (a T , y T ) are mutually consistent ifσ T prescribes a T with a positive probability based on y T .
(ii) There exist {w T , c T } ∞ T =1 such that for each T and â T , y T that are mutually con-
(iii) There exists α > 1 independent of T such that for each T ∈ N, U (ψ, · · · , ψ, ψ) = C T (1 + αµ − T ) and U (ψ, · · · , ψ, ψ ) = αĈ T for some ψ, ψ .
Part (ii) deserves further explanations. Intuitively, this part says that if the expected values of the performance test statistic at the data generating profile and the target action profile are close, then the welfare improvement and the action cost of the data generating action profile are bounded uniformly from below over all realizations of public signals that are mutually consistent with the recommended action profile. This assumption is more likely to be satisfied if (1) target action profiles yield homogeneous welfare improvements and (2) public signals have limited impacts on the welfare improvement and the action cost once the action profile is fixed.
Test Contract The modified test contract ϕ T (·), R T (·), ψ T , ψ T varies the test with the recommended action profile. At each instant t = 1, · · · , T − 1, the principal pays a fixed consumption ψ T and recommends a pure actionâ t based onσ T and the history of recommendations and signals (â t−1 , y t−1 ). At the end of instant T , based on the profile of recommended actionsâ T and realized signals y T , she tests if
If the result is affirmative, then the agent passes the test and receives ψ T as before. Otherwise he fails the test and earns ψ T instead, where ψ T and ψ T satisfy
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 4, the contract ϕ T (·), R T (·), ψ T , ψ T has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ * T that satisfies Theorem 1 (i)-(ii) where W * T , C * T and Π * T are replaced byŴ T ,Ĉ T andΠ T , respectively.
Serial Correlation
Now suppose that Ω T is countable and Y t depends only on a t , Y t−1 , · · · , Y t−d for some d ∈ N that is independent of T for each t = 1, · · · , T . Define X t (Y t , · · · Y t−d+1 ), taking obvious care when dealing with X 1 , · · · , X d . Clearly, X 1 , · · · , X T : a T is a Markov chain whose t th contraction coefficient is denoted by θ t a T . Define
assuming that the latter exists (see Section 2 for sufficient conditions for existence). Consider a performance test statistic ϕ T : Ω T T → R that is ϕ T -Lipschitz with respect to the normalized Hamming metric for some ϕ T > 0 (see Section 2 for definitions and examples): 
Conclusion
I conclude by discussing several avenues of future research. First, the main result of this paper attributes the implementability of asymptotic near-efficiency to two basic properties of the monitoring technology but not to other model details. It is interesting to extend the analysis to dynamic games with imperfect public monitoring. In continuous-time games where signals follow Levy processes, Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2010) shows that Poisson signals may effectively sustain cooperations whereas Brownian signals cannot. A natural question is whether similar predictions can be made when we allow for general monitoring technologies. Second, our sufficient condition for attaining asymptotic near-efficiency is almost necessary in agency models with stationary technologies and frequent actions. This leaves open the question of whether the same is true in general. It is the author's belief that in order to prove or disprove this conjecture, we need new techniques that yield robust upper bounds for the optimal profit level in general agency models.
Finally, the analysis so far has considered a relatively frictionless environment which abstracts away from many real-world contractual frictions. However, the robustness of the test contract makes it an attractive solution to real-world contracting problems when there is hidden savings (Appendix B.1), persistent hidden characteristics (Appendix B. µ − T = 1 2 µ T . To make progress, I treat one period as a quarter, apply the standard annual discount rate 5% and take b T = T −0.05 . Consider two cases:
• α = 2, c T ∈ 1 15 b T , 1 8 b T , i.e., if the agent passes the test at the regular event, then the per-period effort cost ranges from 88% to 94% of the full effort cost. Notice that b T 15 and b T 8 are very conservative estimates of c T because in Example 1, c T = u (u −1 (c))·2b T c ≈ u (u −1 (12000))·2b T 12000 1 15 b T based on a conservative estimate of the quarterly labor cost c = 12000. If c T is indeed close to this number, then the performance depicted below is obtained when α is slightly greater than one.
• α = 3, c T ∈ 1 4.5 b T , 1 7 b T , i.e., if the agent passes the test at the regular event, then the per-period effort cost ranges from 78% to 86% of the full effort cost. Figures A.1 -A.4 plot the upper bound for the equilibrium probability of failure prescribed by Theorem 1 (i) against T . Since this bound is well below 11% after one year, we should be able to obtain near-efficiency relatively fast under reasonable assumptions about the production technology (w T , η T ) and the compensation function Ψ T (·). Moreover, the feasibility of penalties, which only need to be slightly higher than the target action cost over a short time span, may not be a concern after all. 
External Financial Market
Suppose that the agent has access to external financial markets. For each income stream (ψ 1 , · · · , ψ T ) paid by the principal, define V (ψ 1 , · · · , ψ T ) = max U (ψ 1 , · · · , ψ T ) : (ψ 1 , · · · , ψ T ) is a feasible final consumption stream given (ψ 1 , · · · , ψ T ) (B.1)
as the agent's maximum utility from final consumptions. Assume that the agent is not heavily subsidized such that large decreases in the last-period consumption reduce his final utility considerably:
takes a T . Define the technology of type θ agent by H  (B.3) be a pure action profile that maximizes the expected profitability of the high type agent in the complete information benchmark. Define W * H,T = W a * T , H and C * H,T = C a * T , H , both of which are assumed to be strictly positive.
Assume that the low type agent's technology is inferior as he needs to incur a significantly higher cost than C * H,T in order to match the expected value of the performance test statistic that the high type agent generates by taking a * T H :
The contract induces a dynamic game where type θ agent's strategy conditional on participating is σ θ,T = {σ θ,t,T : A t−1 × Ω t−1 T → ∆(A)}. Type θ agent's optimal strategy conditional on participating σ * θ,T is defined by
The contract induces type θ agent to participate if and only if
Corollary 4. Under Assumption 1, an analog of Assumption 3 which replaces a * T , W * T and C * T with a * T H , W * H,T and C * H,T , respectively, and Assumption 6, Theorem 1 holds for the high type agent whereas the low type agent abstains when T is large.
B.3 Limited Liability
Now suppose that the agent is risk-neutral but is protected by limited liability and must receive a non-negative consumption in each period. Consider a contract (ϕ T (·), R T , ψ T (·)) which delivers no consumption at t = 1, · · · , T −1,
for some arbitrary α > 1.
Corollary 5. Under Assumption 1, 2 and 3 (i)-(ii), the contract (ϕ T (·), R T , ψ T (·)) has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ * T where for each T ∈ N, (i) The probability of failure is at most
B.4 Partnership Game
Environment A team of n risk-neutral players face zero outside options at the outset. Throughout t = 1, · · · , T , each player i takes an action profile a T i ∈ A T i that costs himself C i a T i where C i (·) ≥ 0 and C i (0, · · · , 0) = 0, and they together improve the team's welfare by W a T where a T = (a T 1 , · · · , a T n ). At the end of each instant t = 1, · · · , T , a random signal Y i,t that is defined on a measurable space (Ω i,T , F i,T ) and depends only on a t i = (a i,1 , · · · , a i,t ) is publicly realized. As before, assume that there is a pure action profile that maximizes the total surplus in the complete information benchmark:
Assumption 7. There exists a * T = a * T 1 , · · · , a * T n such that Performance Test Statistic No player observes the action or the welfare contribution of other players directly. However, it is common knowledge that 13 Assumption 8. There exist {b i,T } ∞ T =1 and {ϕ i,T : Ω T i,T → R} ∞ T =1 for each i = 1, · · · , n such that for each T ∈ N,
where λ i W * T > C * i,T for all i and n i=1 λ i = 1. At the outset, the contract becomes binding if all players prefer to participate rather than to abstain. Throughout, players take private actions and observe public signals. At t = T , player i receives a compensation which equals a share λ i of the expected welfare improvement at the target action profile minus a small adjustment term if he passes the test and zero other-
For simplicity, let there be a disinterested third party which absorbs the budget surplus and makes up the budget deficit if necessary.
The test contract induces a dynamic game. Since each player i's payoff depends only on his own actions, I restrict attention to strategies σ i,T = {σ i,t,T : A t−1 ×Ω t−1 T → ∆(A)} which map i's own history of actions and performance measures to the current action choice. The solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the optimal strategy σ * i,T is defined by
The contract is individually rational if
, ∀i (B.10) as the highest welfare improvement if all players spend an action cost that is bounded from above by his expected loss from taking a * T i under the test contract. Assume that W T is close to W * T when T is large:
Corollary 6. Under Assumptions 7-9, there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ *
where for each T ∈ N, (i) The expected efficiency gain from production satisfies
.
(ii) The probability of running budget deficits is bounded from above by
The expected budget surplus is bounded from below by
(a) Production is asymptotically near-efficient, i.e.,
The expected budget deficit is a negligible share of the efficiency gain from production:
= 0 (c) The expected budget surplus is a negligible share of the efficiency gain from production:
B.5 Incomplete Knowledge about the Monitoring Technology Theorem 1 shows that under certain regularity conditions, it suffices to know only the expected value of a performance test statistic and the cost of the target action profile in order to construct the test contract, the parsimony of which makes it an appealing solution to real-world incentive problems when the contract designer knows few details about a potentially complex monitoring technology (e.g., incentivizing researchers who have similar long-run productivities but different short-run productivities that vary with the project being pursued and personal workstyles). In this section, I formalize this intuition by showing that if the principal faces a potentially complex monitoring technology, then conducting performance tests whose properties she is confident about yields a robust profit guarantee that is difficult to improve upon within the class of test contracts. To fix ideas, consider this example:
Example 5. In Example 1, suppose that the principal knows the expected total revenue and the cost of the target action profile, based on which she can guarantee herself a near-optimal profit through the average-revenue test contract when T is large. 14 Nevertheless, she wants to test the mean of revenues over the first half horizon, though she is aware that the agent's productivity (or technology) varies a lot over this time span. In particular,
• For each x ∈ [0, 1], there exists a technology where the expected average revenue over the first half horizon equals exactly to x for all decent action profiles that cost the agent at most αC * T for some arbitrary α > 1. Under these technologies, one can only identify the agent's true effort through the output over the second half horizon unless the agent works exceedingly hard;
• For each x ∈ [0, 1], there exists a technology and an inferior action profile which incurs a significantly lower action cost than C * T , yields a significantly lower expected profit than Π * T in the complete information benchmark but generates an expected average revenue x over the first half horizon. Under these technologies, if the agent deviates to inferior actions, then he will not be detected based on the outcome over the first half horizon because there exist decent action profiles which yield the same expected revenue over this time span under the technologies described in the previous bullet point.
In this example, if the principal is concerned about the worst-case performance of contracts that test the average revenue over the first half horizon, then she faces a dilemma when T is large: on the one hand, she has to pass the agent if the realized test statistic lies in [0, 1] because otherwise there is a technology under which the agent has to incur a significantly higher action cost than C * T in order to pass the test and thus becomes expensive to incentivize; but if the acceptance region does include [0, 1], then the agent will deviate to inferior action profiles that are significantly less profitable and yet allow him to pass with almost certainty. In fact, Proposition 1 shows that no contract that tests the average revenue over the first half horizon beats the average revenue test contract when T is large. Therefore, testing the average revenue over the first half horizon is a misleading idea.
The remainder of this section formalizes this intuition. In the setup of Section 3, suppose that in the complete information benchmark, those actions that are significantly less costly than the target action profile are also significantly less profitable:
Assumption 10. There exists κ, γ ∈ (0, 1) such that if C a T < κC * T , then Π a T < γΠ * T .
Fix an arbitrary κ ∈ (0, κ) and define
as the maximum expected profit when the agent's net payoff is (κ − κ)C * T in the complete information benchmark. For each α > 1, define
as the maximum expected profit when the agent's gross compensation is αC * T in the complete information benchmark. In most environments of interest, it is legitimate to assume that Finally, assume that the principal knows some performance test statistic (e.g., the mean of revenues at the target action profile) well enough to secure a near-optimal profit through the corresponding test contract when T is large:
Assumption 12. It is common knowledge that (i) There exists a sequence {b T ,φ T } ∞ T =1 that satisfies Assumption 3;
(ii) The test contract based on (b T ,φ T ) is asymptotically near-efficient, i.e., Expected Profit Proposition 1 illustrates the dilemma faced by the principal when T is large. On the one hand, Part (i) says that for each monitoring technology, there is a decent action profile that costs at most αC * T at which the expected value of the max-min performance test statistic lies in a b T -blowup of the max-min acceptance region. In other words, under no circumstances the test will pass the agent only if the latter incurs a significantly higher action cost than C * T and thus make overall compensation expensive. On the other hand, Part (ii) says that a slight shrinkage of the max-min acceptance region should not contain the expected value of max-min test statistic at any inferior action profile for any monitoring technology. This is true because otherwise there exists a technology under which the agent will deviate to an inferior action profile without being penalized and yield a significantly lower expected profit than Π * T . As an imperfect analogy, one may think of these two mistakes as the Type I and Type II errors, respectively.
Unfortunately, when the set of feasible technologies is rich whereas the principal knows too little to separate the expected value of the max-min test statistic at decent action profiles versus inferior action profiles, then Parts (i) and (ii) cannot hold simultaneously. For instance, this paradox is present in Example 5 where the mean of revenues over the first half horizon cannot not the max-min test statistic when T is large. To see why, suppose that the contrary is true. Then the first and the second bullet point can be written as [0, 1] 
respectively. Thus, we have 1 ≤ 3 2 b T , which is impossible when T is large.
C Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1 (ii) and (b):
Proof. By Part (i), it suffices to pay U (ψ T , · · · , ψ T ) ≥ C * T (1 + αµ − T ) to satisfy the agent's ex-ante participation constraint. Meanwhile, it follows from Assumption 3 whereas the expected payoff from taking a * T is bounded from below by U (ψ T , · · · , ψ T ) − C * T + αC * T µ − T For the first expression to be weakly greater than the second expression, we need
Proof of Corollary 4
Proof. Theorem 1 clearly holds for the high type agent. In order to show that the low type agent abstains when T is large, define where the inequality follows from Theorem 1 that it suffices to pay the high type agent C * H,T (1 + αµ − H,T ) to satisfy his ex-ante participation constraint. Clearly, the last expression is strictly negative when T is sufficiently large.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Part (i): Suppose that the contrary is true. Then for each {b T , µ T } ∞ T =1 that satisfies lim T →∞ b T = lim T →∞ µ T = 0 (these sequences exist by assumption) and each T ∈ N, there exists T > T and I(T ) such that B b T E[ϕ m T (Y)|a T , I(T )] ⊂ R m T for all
